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to argue that market socialism would be susceptible to the inefficiencies of rent-seeking because 
politicians cannot be sufficiently incentivized to promote economically efficient resource allocation. 
Although the target of Shleifer's and Vishny's criticism is market socialism, their arguments would 
appear to apply to numerous economic systems, such democratic socialism and social democracy.
But Shleifer and Vishny (1994: 170) dismiss F. A. Hayek's The Road to Serfdom (2007 [1944]) 
because Hayek's work “made a relatively bigger impression on public opinion than on the economics 
profession” (Shleifer and Vishny 1994: 168). Nor do Shleifer and Vishny explain in any detail what 
Hayek's arguments were. According to their laconic summary, Hayek “argued that democracy is 
impossible in a country where a single leader has all the power that comes with controlling capital” 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1994: 170). While this is not inaccurate, it is extremely over-simplified. Hayek's 
argument was much more detailed than this and it deserves further attention. Although Shleifer and 
Vishny's general argument is persuasive, Hayek's own contribution is undeservedly neglected.
Even two authors highly sympathetic to Hayek concede that Hayek's theory was “[not] 
particularly detailed” (Lawson and Clark 2010: 231), and even they can identify only three specific 
arguments which Hayek made: first, that power corrupts; second, that planners must subject voters to 
propaganda and political controls in order to dupe voters into supporting the code of values guiding and 
underlying the planners' plan; and third, that if voters' preferences are not stable, then for the plan to 
maintain stability and consistency, it must be administered non-democratically. Lawson and Clark note 
that these latter two explanations are inconsistent: according to one, voters are tricked into 
democratically supporting the plan, and according to the other, the plan is insulated from democracy, 
kept out of the voters' hands so that their support is not even necessary. By one account, the voters are 
duped, and by another, they are bypassed.
But Hayek's arguments are far more sophisticated than this and less inconsistent with each other 
than Lawson and Clark (2010) suggest. According to Peter J. Boettke (1995), Hayek (2007 [1944]) 
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demonstrated familiarity with several of the key claims of contemporary Public Choice, including a 
form of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem (Boettke 1995: 19f., Boettke and Leeson 2002).1 According to 
Hayek, no single consistent, coherent plan can be arrived at by democratic means. The need to dupe 
voters and/or to keep the plan out of their hands are simply two corollaries of a single Arrow paradox, 
equivalent to agenda-setting on the one hand and dictatorship on the other. Hayek's argument was more 
sophisticated than many have realized, and it deserves more attention.
This essay will compare the arguments made by Shleifer-Vishny on the one hand and Hayek on 
the other, demonstrating their mutual compatibility. Furthermore, it will expand on the Boettke-Leeson 
claim that Hayek presaged Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. Finally, this essay will explore how the 
Hayek/Arrow-type argument affects the respective policies of democratic socialism and deliberative 
democracy. I will demonstrate that the Arrow-type argument poses a grave dilemma for democratic 
socialism and for deliberative democracy. These two systems must be deemed “impossible” in the 
Misesian sense that they cannot satisfy the desires of its advocates.2 Because of Arrow's Impossibility 
Theorem, the political institution of democracy is fundamentally incompatible with both the economic 
system of socialism as well as the achievement of democratic consensus by deliberation3
The essay proceeds as follows: section I summarizes Shleifer and Vishny (1994). Section II 
explores Hayek's arguments, elaborating Boettke's and Leeson's claim that Hayek presaged Arrow's 
Impossibility Theorem. Section III describes how Hayek's arguments have different implications for 
socialism than Shleifer and Vishny's. Finally, section IV shows how Hayek's arguments against 
socialism apply to deliberative democracy as well.
I. SHLEIFER AND VISHNY'S “THE POLITICS OF MARKET SOCIALISM” (1994)
According to Shleifer and Vishny (1994: 165f.), “Under all forms of market socialism . . . 
politicians' objectives must determine resource allocation. Market socialists have traditionally assumed 
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that politicians will assume an efficient resource allocation.” Advocates of democratic or market 
socialism “all presume efficiency-maximizing politicians” (Shleifer and Vishny 1994: 167) and when 
they prescribe what a good government ought to do, they “presume that it actually wants to do so” 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1994: 167). Their criticism is essentially an application of the familiar and 
accepted conclusions of Public Choice (Shleifer and Vishny 1994: 168) and it basically predicts a 
failure of political institutions to create appropriate incentives or to prevent the abuse of power. Shleifer 
and Vishny use the economic theory of rational, utility-maximizing individuals to cast doubt on the 
general willingness of politicians – who are human – to implement market socialism the way it is 
supposed to be. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1994: 166) claim that Oskar Lange (1938)'s proposal for market socialism 
successfully refuted Ludwig von Mises's argument that economic calculation is impossible under 
socialism. Therefore, they criticize only the political feasibility of market socialism, not its theoretical 
economic validity. They would appear to agree with Heilbroner's (2008) statement about Soviet-style 
central planning, that “[t]he crucial missing element is not so much 'information,' as Mises and Hayek 
argued, as it is the motivation to act on information” (cf. Caldwell 1997: 1875-1886).
In addition, Shleifer and Vishny have a second argument against market socialism: citing 
Mancur Olson (1965) and Gary Becker (1983), they argue that market socialism  is vulnerable to rent-
seeking, creating economic inefficiencies (Shleifer and Vishny 1994: 171f.). They concede that the 
same problem exists under democratic capitalism, but they claim that the inefficiencies would be worse 
under market socialism (Shleifer and Vishny 1994: 172-174).4 Hence, the criticism by Shleifer and 
Vishny of market socialism is a simple – though nonetheless valuable – application of straightforward, 
textbook Public Choice: political officials will have insufficient incentive to implement market 
socialism according to the specified rules, and rent-seeking inefficiencies will undermine the rules and 
efficacy of the system.5
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II. HAYEK'S ARGUMENTS
Like Shleifer and Vishny (1994), Hayek (2007 [1944]) used economic analysis to criticize the 
political institutional logic of democratic socialism. His argument is therefore a form of Public Choice 
(Boettke 1995 re: Hayek). Whereas some scholars believe that Hayek completely ignored Public 
Choice (Boettke 1995: 7), Boettke (1995: 8) claims that The Road to Serfdom “set out to explicate how 
socialist ideas change the demands on democratic institutions and how these institutions are in turn 
transformed into instruments of totalitarian rule because of their inability to meet these changing 
demands in a manner consistent with democratic principles.” Hayek's contribution was the Public 
Choice application of specifically Austrian economic theory to decision-making within non-market 
settings (Boettke 1995: 19).6
In fact, several of Hayek's arguments are highly similar to those of Shleifer and Vishny, making 
it all the more surprising that Shleifer and Vishny dismissed Hayek's arguments as irrelevant. 
According to Boettke, Hayek claimed that the socialist rejection of competition would unintentionally 
empower interest groups and encourage special pleading for protection (Boettke 1995: 10).7 Thus, 
Hayek understood one of the central claims of modern Public Choice, the logic of concentrated benefits 
and dispersed costs (Boettke 1995: 10). Furthermore, Hayek's defense of the rule of law – that laws 
should be abstract and generally applicable to all – may be understood as a call for a legal rule which 
eliminates opportunities for interest groups to obtain special exemptions and concessions by special 
pleading (Boettke 1995: 10). In Boettke's reading, Hayek's argument is very similar to Shleifer and 
Vishny's concerning rent-seeking.
Like Shleifer and Vishny, Hayek also understood that “power corrupts,” that political officials 
are self-interested humans as well. According to Boettke (1995: 11f.), Hayek examined the institutional 
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incentives facing those holding political power under socialism. Just as market production is guided by 
comparative advantage, so is political production. Under both market and political systems, production 
proceeds according to opportunity cost. But a political system will tend to reward those who are less 
than morally scrupulous about the use and abuse of political power. Socialism fails, not because a few 
“bad men” accidentally find themselves in power. On the contrary, it is the institutional incentives of a 
socialist political regime answer which explain “why the worst get on top” (Hayek 2007 [1944]: 157-
170). The system of discretionary planning requires the use of authority, and this incentivizes those 
most willing to use authority with the fewest scruples. Once again, in Boettke's reading, Hayek's 
argument resembles that of Shleifer and Vishny and basic Public Choice.
But Hayek went beyond Shleifer's and Vishny's (correct) argument that political officials will 
misuse their power and be insufficiently incentivized, giving rise to economic inefficiency. Hayek 
anticipated Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, which “could be reinterpreted as an application of Mises's 
impossibility thesis to non-market decision making via democratic voting” (Boettke 1995: 19). Just as 
Mises argued that a socialist planner could not economically calculate, a democratic socialist polity – 
said Hayek – could not “calculate” the will of the people. Similarly, Arrow showed that it is impossible 
to aggregate a multitude of individually ordinal and transitive preference functions into one single 
ordinal-transitive social preference function. Any possible voting rule whatsoever will be susceptible to 
one of several paradoxes, and given individually transitive and ordinal preferences, there is no 
mathematically-guaranteed way to aggregate them together into one social preference function while 
avoiding paradoxes. The only means by which the political preference function can satisfy all of 
Arrow's conditions and avoid paradox is through dictatorship, because dictatorship avoids the need to 
aggregate individual preference functions into one social preference function in the first place (Butler 
2012: 32; Stevens 1993: 47, 143-145; Hinich and Munger 1997: 95-99). While Hayek's argument is not 
mathematical in nature, and he does not prove it with the same systematic logical rigor as Arrow, the 
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two nevertheless argued much the same point. Unfortunately, at the time Hayek wrote, “a naïve view of 
democratic governance dominated discourse” and it was believed that “[t]he voting process 
unambiguously conveyed the necessary information” (Boettke 1995: 15). Therefore, critics could not 
understand Hayek's point (Boettke 1995: 13-18). In fact, Hayek's point is still misunderstood today 
(Boettke and Snow 2012:431 re: McPhail and Farrant 2012:424f.).
According to Hayek, democratic socialism gives rise to difficulties more profound than the 
mere allocational inefficiencies of rent-seeking. Instead, democracy is fundamentally incompatible with 
socialism on the most basic, essential level. The problem is not merely that politicians will abuse their 
power or that socialism will give rise to economic inefficiency. Rather, democracy and socialism are 
fundamentally incompatible and democratic socialism is incoherent. It is not merely that government 
officials will have the wrong priorities or that they will use their power with malicious intent – that 
power corrupts. In contrast to Shleifer and Vishny, Hayek argues that even a perfectly well-intentioned, 
benevolent, and altruistic government will nevertheless fail to accomplish the purposes of socialism 
because the political institutions of democracy are fundamentally incompatible with the economic goals 
of socialism. The political and economic systems simply do not match up in any coherent fashion.
The fundamental problem is that promotion of “the common good” or “the general welfare” 
requires aggregating individual preference scales into one single, societal scale. As he said (2007 
[1944]: 101),
To direct all our activities according to a single plan presupposes that every one of our 
needs is given its rank in an order of values which which must be complete enough to 
make it possible to decide among all the different courses which the planner has to 
choose. It presupposes, in short, the existence of a complete ethical code in which all the 
different human values are allotted their due place.
This is the very same problem of preference aggregation which Arrow famously studied. McPhail and 
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Farrant (2012:424f.) complain that Hayek does not mention Condorcet cycling, to which Boettke and 
Snow (2012:431) respond that nevertheless, Hayek – like Arrow – was making “a point about whether 
we can form a coherent social welfare function via democratic means.” Like Arrow, Hayek understood 
that “Coherent planning presupposes agreement on a common value scale, but such a value scale is 
next to impossible the more the scope of the state grows. . . . In other words, socialist aspirations run 
into trouble because society has no coherent value scale.”
According to Hayek, the problem is not immediately apparent because the popular agreement 
on the necessity for planning may conceal a disagreement on the precise values and goals which 
planning is to achieve.8 The problem is that under socialism (Hayek 2007 [1944]: 104),
the agreement on the desirability of planning is not supported by agreement on the ends 
the plan is to serve. The effect of the people's agreeing that there must be central 
planning, without agreeing on the ends, will be rather as if a group of people were to 
commit themselves to take a journey together without agreeing where they want to go: 
with the result that they may all have to make a journey which most of them do not want 
at all. 
And so the product of democratic socialism will be – to quote a statement made in another context – 
“one big compromise, just like a bill in the Assembly that no one wants to pass but no one is willing to 
kill. The thing gets modified and diddled in committee until it's equally unacceptable to everyone” 
(“Thresher” 174).9 Therefore, as Nicholas Capaldi and Gordon Lloyd have noted (2011: p. xxi, n. 4), 
“Marxists have always been rightly contemptuous of democratic socialism because shifting majorities 
literally makes even the façade of economic planning impossible.” Like Arrow, Hayek argued that the 
impossibility of preference aggregation could be avoided only through dictatorship. When the plan fails 
for the reasons indicated, “It is inevitable that they should impose their scale of preferences on the 
community for which they plan” (Hayek 2007 [1944]:106). Thus, “The belief is becoming more and 
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more widespread that, if things are to get done, the responsible authorities must be freed from the 
fetters of democratic procedure” (2007 [1944]:108).
Furthermore, Hayek argued (2007 [1944]: 106f.), this problem could not be solved by 
decentralization or delegation:
Nor can a coherent plan be achieved by breaking it up into parts and voting on particular 
issues. A democratic assembly voting and amending a comprehensive economic plan 
clause by clause, as it deliberates on an ordinary bill, makes nonsense. An economic 
plan, to deserve the name, must have a unitary conception. Even if a parliament could, 
proceeding step by step, agree on some scheme, it would certainly in the end satisfy 
nobody. A complex whole in which all the parts must be most carefully adjusted to each 
other cannot be achieved through a compromise between conflicting views. . . . Even if, 
by this expedient, a democracy should succeed in planning every sector of economic 
activity, it would still have to face the problem of integrating these separate plans into a 
unitary whole. Many separate plans do not make a planned whole. 
Thus, democratic procedure simply cannot produce the unitary economic planning which 
socialism demands. Democratic socialism can furnish only a disjointed hodge-podge of contradictory 
laws and regulations which have no unifying theme or purpose, defeating the purpose of socialism. No 
consensus will be forthcoming where “there exists no agreed view on what ought to be done” (Hayek 
2007 [1944]: 101). Democracy may be workable for the management and regulation of a free-market 
economy simply because the government's activities are so restricted. A “night-watchman” state has far 
less to do than a socialist state. In other words, the smaller the scope of government, the simpler the 
task of achieving democratic consensus. But socialism dramatically expands the scope of government 
to embrace all aspects of life whatsoever. A consensus is more difficult to achieve the broader the scope 
of the state's activities. Nothing remotely resembling a consensus can be obtained when the 
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government's scope is so expanded to embrace all aspects of life. Whereas markets promote and 
encourage diversity and pluralism, governance demands uniformity. The more government supplants 
markets, the more uniformity replaces diversity. Greater reliance on government means that people 
cannot be allowed to go their own way, but more and more people must somehow agree on more and 
more subjects. As Hayek said, “[T]he probability that they [those attempting to achieve a democratic 
consensus] will agree on a particular course of action necessarily decreases as the scope of such action 
extends” (Hayek 2007 [1944]:103). “We may rely on voluntary agreement to guide the action of the 
state only so long as it is confined to spheres where agreement exists” (Hayek 2007 [1944]: 103). But 
in pursuing a socialist policy, “democracy embarks upon a course of planning which in its execution 
requires more agreement than in fact exists” (Hayek 2007 [1944]: 103).10 
While The Road to Serfdom – written in 1944 – contains Hayek's most complete exposition of 
these arguments, he had in fact already adumbrated the essence of this claim as long ago as 1935. Jesús 
Huerta de Soto (2010: 268n53) quotes Hayek's second essay on economic calculation, published in 
1935 (Hayek 1935: 216f. rpt. in Hayek 1948: 160):
The dictator, who himself ranges in order the different needs of the members of the 
society according to his views about their merits, has saved himself the trouble of 
finding out what people really prefer and avoided the impossible task of combining the 
individual scales into an agreed common scale which expresses the general ideas of 
justice. But if he wants to follow this norm with any degree of rationality or consistency, 
if he wants to realize what he considers to be the ends of the community, he will have to 
solve all the problems which we have discussed already.
Huerta de Soto comments (2010: 268n53), “we see here that as early as 1935, Hayek appears to have 
made precursory mention of 'Arrow's impossibility theorem' when he wrote of the impossible task of 
combining individual value scales into a common scale.”
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Only a few years later, in 1938 and 1939 – still prior to the 1944 publication of The Road to 
Serfdom – Hayek expanded this brief statement into a more complete argument. In two pamphlets, both 
titled “Freedom and the Economic System,” written in 1938 and 1939, Hayek dealt with the problem in 
a manner almost as complete as that in The Road to Serfdom. According to Hayek, central economic 
planning “presupposes a much more complete agreement on the relative importance of the different 
ends than actually exists” (Hayek 1997 [1938]: 182, 1997 [1939]: 193). Planning requires preference 
aggregation or “a complete ranging of the different ends in the order of their importance” (1997 [1938]: 
183; cf. 1997 [1939]: 201). This would necessitate “the existence of . . . a complete moral code in 
which all the relative values of all human ends . . . are assigned a definite place and a definite 
quantitative significance” (1997 [1939]:201f.). As in The Road to Serfdom, Hayek argued in 1938 and 
1939 the probability of agreement on a single scale of values declines as the scope of government 
activity expands (1997 [1938]: 184, 1997 [1939]: 205). The agreement that planning is necessary, 
combined with the inability to agree on the details of the plan, tends to create the demand for “some 
single person” to “be freed from the fetters of democratic procedure” in order “to get things done” 
(1997 [1938]: 184, 1997 [1939]: 205). Delegation will not work because “Many special plans do not 
yet make a planned whole” (1997 [1939]: 205). In one passage written in 1939, Hayek is actually more 
explicit and complete than anything he wrote in The Road to Serfdom. Explaining why the 
impossibility of preference aggregation leads to dictatorship, Hayek noted in 1939 that economic 
rationality applies only to an individual's pursuit of his own personal ends. When preferences cannot be 
aggregated, collective decision-making cannot be rational. Rationality can be achieved only by 
substituting the will of an individual for the will of the collective – exactly as Arrow proved. In Hayek's 
words (1997 [1939]: 206):
'Rational' action is only possible in the service of a given system of ends, and if society 
as a whole is to act rationally it must be given such a common scale of values. The 
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dictator will find at a very early stage that if he wants to carry out the will of the people 
he will have to tell them what to want.
Thus, Hayek's realization of these Arrow-type problems predates the publication of The Road to 
Serfdom in 1944. He first conceived of these Arrow-type issues at least as early as 1935, and by 1938 
and 1939, he had elaborated his original 1935 insight almost as completely as he would in 1944.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIALISM
As we saw, Shleifer and Vishny (1994: 171f.) argue that market socialism will give rise to rent-
seeking inefficiencies. Essentially, GDP will be less than it could have been and resources will be 
misallocated. And as we saw, Boettke (1995: 10) argues that Hayek also understood the logic of 
“concentrated benefits, dispersed costs.” But unlike Shleifer and Vishny, Hayek does not merely argue 
that interest group lobbying will lead to more economic inefficiency. Instead, Hayek's argument is more 
fundamental: the very existence of interest group lobbying is fundamentally at odds with the very 
essence and intention of socialism. Central economic planning only makes sense if there is a unitary, 
consistent, coherent central plan. The very existence of conflicting interest groups which influence 
government, regardless of the magnitude of the inefficiency they engender, defeats the very purpose of 
socialism. 
One of the fundamental Marxist criticisms of the market had been that the market economy is 
an “anarchy of production” which must be replaced with conscious, rational direction. Socialists found 
it unconscionable that the market was being driven by price-signals which seemed to emerge from 
nowhere. Only a consciously-designed system, they thought, was deserving of rational human beings. 
As Mises said (1981 [1922]: 413),
To the socialist, the coming of Socialism means a transition from an irrational to a 
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rational economy. Under Socialism, planned management of economic life takes the 
place of anarchy of production; society, which is conceived as the incarnation of reason, 
takes the place of the conflicting aims of unreasonable and self-interested individuals.
Thus, many socialists were concerned not only with inequality and poverty but also with the fact that 
the apparent irrationality and inscrutability of the unplanned spontaneous order of the market economy. 
It was cosmically unfair that rational human beings had to obey mysterious price signals. Only 
socialism – the conscious, central direction of the economy – would allow man to finally live as man 
and not animal, guiding his own destiny, living rationally according to his own will. The anarchy of 
production was an existential injustice which made a mockery of humankind, as Engels made clear in 
Socialism: Utopian and Scientific (Engels 1892 [1890]: ch. 3):
But when once [the] nature [economic and productive forces are] understood, they can, 
in the hands of the producers working together, be transformed from master demons into 
willing servants. . . . [We will]  subject them more and more to our own will, and by 
means of them to reach our own ends. . . . With the seizing of the means of production 
by society, production of commodities is done away with, and, simultaneously, the 
mastery of the product over the producer. Anarchy in social production is replaced by 
systematic, definite organization. The struggle for individual existence disappears. Then, 
for the first time, man, in a certain sense, is finally marked off from the rest of the 
animal kingdom, and emerges from mere animal conditions of existence into really 
human ones. The whole sphere of the conditions of life which environ man, and which 
have hitherto ruled man, now comes under the dominion and control of man, who for 
the first time becomes the real, conscious lord of nature, because he has now become 
master of his own social organization. The laws of his own social action, hitherto 
standing face-to-face with man as laws of Nature foreign to, and dominating him, will 
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then be used with full understanding, and so mastered by him. Man's own social 
organization, hitherto confronting him as a necessity imposed by Nature and history, 
now becomes the result of his own free action. The extraneous objective forces that 
have, hitherto, governed history,pass under the control of man himself. Only from that 
time will man himself, more and more consciously, make his own history — only from 
that time will the social causes set in movement by him have, in the main and in a 
constantly growing measure, the results intended by him. It is the ascent of man from 
the kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of freedom. 
For socialists, abolishing the anarchy of production took on cosmic importance. It was not merely 
about achieving social justice. It was about freeing mankind from an animal existence and finally 
letting it live as human beings. The abolition of capitalism meant mankind would be free to fulfill its 
destiny as rational beings (Lavoie 1985a: 46). As David Ramsay Steele (1992: 39-43) notes, this 
abhorrence to the anarchy of production relates to the critique of commodity fetishism. “For Marx, 
commodity fetishism is something which always arises automatically from the fact that the market is 
unplanned” (Steele 1992: 40). Steele (1992: 41) argues that for Marx, this is more important than 
material inequality:
It is this absence of control by human beings of their individual and collective destinies 
which is the true source of the pathos of Capital. Readers impressed primarily by the 
documented physical deprivation and squalor have read it superficially. Capital is a saga 
of the mysterious, macabre adventures that befall people who have lost conscious 
control of their collective lives.
But, Steele (1992: 43), “Marx never considers that the fetishism of commodities maybe no odder than 
the fetishism of committees.” 
Therefore, Hayek's criticism cuts closer to the heart of the matter than Shleifer's and Vishny's. 
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Shleifer and Vishny predict that interest group lobbying will engender economic inefficiency, but 
conceivably, a socialist could be willing to tolerate greater economic inefficiency if this maximized 
other, more important goals, such as income equality. As Hayek noted (1935: 240 rpt. in 1948: 178),
But even if it could be agreed what exactly would be the effects of any of the proposed 
systems on the national income, there would still be the further question of whether any 
given reduction, either of its present absolute magnitude or of its future rate of progress, 
is not too high a price for the realization of the ethical ideal of greater equality of 
incomes. On this question, of course, scientific argument must give way to individual 
conviction 
In fact, if equality is the goal of socialism, then sacrificing economic productivity for equality would 
not entail economic inefficiency at all, because efficiency means the satisfaction of one's goals at least 
cost. If one's goal is income equality, then it may be efficient to sacrifice wealth maximization in favor 
of equality. If rent-seeking and the conferral of privileges for special interests somehow promoted 
equality, then this might actually be efficient. If this is the case, the Shleifer and Vishny's critique is 
irrelevant. But according to Hayek, interest groups would not merely produce economic inefficiency 
but they would give rise to directionless and incoherent anarchy. Similarly, Lavoie (1985a: 161) says 
about the democratic socialists that, “To the extent that they insist on genuinely decentralized decision-
making they are proposing the arbitrary and uncoordinated injection of contradictory policies by all 
levels and departments of government. In other words they have a prescription for chaos, not rational 
planning.” 
If Hayek is correct, it is not merely that socialism is inefficient, as Shleifer and Vishny claim. 
Instead, socialism utterly fails its aspiration to enable man to live according to reason. The existence of 
rent-seeking under socialism means that mankind will fail to elevate itself beyond the animal reliance 
on the forces of nature. If socialism means chaotic jockeying among interest groups with an irrational, 
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indeterminate outcome, then man is still a slave to forces beyond his control. The inconvenience of 
economic inefficiency pales against the cosmic injustice of the anarchy of production which would 
remain unresolved under socialism.
The Arrow theorem – presaged by Hayek – thus poses a grave dilemma for democratic 
socialism. What socialism fundamentally aims to accomplish is the transformation of society from a 
“civil association” of shared means – such as private property and the rule-of-law – intended to create a 
“spontaneous order” which enables all its members to pursue their own happiness as they individually 
define it for themselves, into a hierarchical “enterprise association” or “organization” of a single set of 
shared ends common to all members of society (Hayek 1973, Oakeshott 1975). It is doubtful whether 
this goal is morally desirable or whether it is compatible with individual freedom, but even if – for the 
sake of argument – we assume that this transformation of society into an organization or enterprise 
association is compatible with liberty and individual rights, the fact is that the Arrow paradox means 
that it is impossible for democratic institutions to successfully accomplish this transformation. 
Democratic institutions, subject to the Arrow paradox, are unable to translate diverse individual ends 
into a single set of shared ends. This is not so damaging for capitalistic or market-based institutions, 
because these have the more modest purpose of maintaining society as a mere civic association. Since 
the goal of such institutions is not to unite society behind one single set of ends, their effectiveness is 
not undermined as much by the Arrow paradox. But because democratic socialism intends to unite 
society behind some single set of shared ends and to transform society into an enterprise association, 
the Arrow paradox is particularly fatal to democratic socialism. Only dictatorship is consistently 
capable of accomplishing socialism's call to transform society from a civic to an enterprise association.
Hayek does not merely say that pressure groups will create economic inefficiencies. His 
criticism is more fundamental: the unitary, coherent, consistent plan demanded by socialism simply 
cannot be obtained under democracy. Democratic socialism cannot work because there is no way to 
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deduce societal preferences or the one and only “general will.” Just as Mises showed that socialism 
cannot economically calculate the optimal production decisions, likewise, Hayek and Arrow showed 
that neither can socialism “calculate” the will of the people or the optimal political policy without 
resorting to dictatorship. If we interpret Hayek's argument as a form of the Arrow theorem, then we can 
understand his claim that the chaos and incoherency of democratic economic planning will tend to 
conclude with the people demanding the appointment of a dictator who can bypass the legislature and 
finally “get things done.” Furthermore, either the dictator will dupe the people into supporting his plan 
or else he will use undemocratic means to bypass the people. Whereas Lawson and Clark (2010: 231) 
claim that Hayek contradicted himself in offering these two possibilities contradict each other, in fact, 
they are simply two equally valid resolutions to the Arrow paradox, corresponding to agenda-setting 
and dictatorship.
The point here is not that democratic socialism must necessarily be dictatorial, but rather that it 
must be dictatorial in order to produce a unitary socialist economic plan. Contrariwise, democratic 
socialism may eschew dictatorship but in doing so, it creates the possibility that the central economic 
plan will be incoherent and random. Arrow's Impossibility Theorem states that one may eliminate 
paradoxes only at the cost of dictatorship and that one may avoid dictatorship only at the cost of 
suffering democratic paradoxes. This undermines the “naive view of democratic governance [which] 
dominated discourse” at the time of Hayek and refutes the notion that “[t]he voting process 
unambiguously conveyed the necessary information” (Boettke 1995: 15).
Interestingly, David Schweickart, an advocate of economic democracy, seems to admit some of 
these problems, saying (1992: 23),
Although the society is democratic, it would not be feasible to attempt a popular vote on 
each investment project. Not only does the sheer number of projects render such a 
procedure unworkable, but it would negate a major benefit of socialized investment: the 
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conscious adoption of a reasonably coordinated, coherent set of investment priorities.
Schweickart seems to agree with Hayek: democracy cannot produce a “reasonably coordinated, 
coherent set of investment priorities.” Another democratic socialist, Michael Harrington seems to have 
caught a glimpse of this problem as well, saying (1978: 443),
[D]ebates over priorities . . . would be resolved by a democratic process in which parties 
would compete with one another over conflicting programs. That, however, would not 
mean a mere extension of present-day “pluralist” theory, which ignores the way formal 
democratic rights, precious as they are, can be subverted by economic and social 
inequalities.
But Harrington does not explain how democratic socialism would avoid the pitfalls of democratic 
pluralism. He even admits (1978: 446), “I am positing the necessity of conflict among organizations 
that would interpret the common good in terms of the particular good of different strata of the 
citizenry.” Neither Schweickart nor Harrington offers any resolution to the problems discovered by 
Hayek.
IV. DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
Although Hayek's Road to Serfdom was written exclusively in response to Soviet-style 
command socialism (Caldwell in Hayek 2007 [1944]:30f., Caldwell 2011, Boettke and Snow 2012, 
Godard 2013), his theory nevertheless poses severe difficulties for deliberative democracy as well.11 
Democratic socialism and deliberative democracy are by no means equivalent, but they share the need 
to achieve a consensus in order to transform society from a civic association into an enterprise 
association. Therefore, we should not be surprised that Hayek's analysis of how factionalism ruins 
democratic socialism, applies to deliberative democracy as well. Specifically, Hayek perceived that 
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unlimited democracy does not always or even necessarily usually result in the majority's oppressing the 
minority. Instead, it sometimes results in the very opposite, where minorities log-roll together to obtain 
special privileges for themselves. As Hayek wrote (1976b: 306), “Omnipotent democracy indeed leads 
of necessity to a kind of socialism, but to a socialism which nobody foresaw or probably wanted . . . 
[operating on] the power of those persons or groups [in the minority] to extort special benefits from the 
government [of the majority].” As Hayek (1967a: 93, 96) further explained, an unlimited democracy 
must be driven by organised interests to use its power of 'legislation' to serve particular 
private ends. . . . Democratic government free to benefit particular groups is bound to be 
dominated by coalitions of organised interests, rather than serve the general interest in 
the classical sense of 'common right and justice, excluding all partial or private 
interests'.12
Hayek argued (1967b: 100) that the only way to prevent this was by limiting the substance of 
legislation to general, abstract, purpose-independent rules which do not specify particular persons or 
goals (cf. Boettke 1995: 10). Furthermore, Hayek said (1976a: 156f.),
In such a democratically elected assembly with unlimited power to confer special 
benefits and impose special burdens on particular groups, a majority can be formed only 
by buying the support of numerous special interests, through granting them such 
benefits at the expense of a minority. . . . It is the result of this bargaining process which 
is dignified as the 'will of the majority.' . . . [N]o genuine agreement among a majority 
exists, but for which the support of a majority has been obtained by deals. . . . In an 
omnipotent assembly which is concerned mainly with particulars and not with 
principles, majorities are therefore not based on agreement of opinions, but are formed 
by aggregations of special interests mutually assisting each other.
Similarly, Hayek said (1973b: 143),
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the majority is not likely to be based on true agreement on principles, but will probably 
consist of coalitions of various organized interests which will mutually concede to each 
other special advantages. Where, as is almost inevitable in a representative body with 
unlimited powers, decisions are arrived at by a bartering of special benefits to different 
groups, and where the formation of a majority capable of governing depends on such 
bartering, it is almost inconceivable that these powers will be used only in the true 
general interests.
Hayek's argument thus poses a special challenge to the theory of deliberative democracy, according to 
which (Hague and Harrop 2007: 46f.)
we should view democracy as a method of communication. ... In an open debate 
arguments based on private interests are soon recognized and discounted; public reason 
involves appeal to the public good. ... In such conditions, a consensus should emerge 
about what is truly in the public interest, with reason triumphing over interests. 
This theory presumes that majorities are “based on agreement of opinions . . . [whereas in fact, they] 
are formed by aggregations of special interests mutually assisting each other” (Hayek 1976a: 157). 
Hague and Harrop (2007: 47) incisively point out that “few advocates of deliberative democracy offer 
specific guidance on institutional arrangements to secure their objective.” The Hayek-Arrow argument 
is therefore applicable to both democratic socialism and to deliberative democracy because both rely on 
the achievement of consensus. 
Whereas Shleifer and Vishny (1994) claim that market socialism will merely give rise to rent-
seeking inefficiencies, Hayek argues that democratic socialism will produce sheer indeterminate chaos. 
An advocate of democratic socialism or deliberative democracy could reply to Shleifer and Vishny that 
they are willing to tolerate a reduction in productivity and GDP if this means greater equality, or if it 
allows mankind to take its destiny into its own hands, or if it assists society in achieving consensus. But 
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Hayek argued that rent-seeking under democratic socialism and deliberative democracy would not 
merely lead to inefficiency, but chaos and absurdity. It is not merely that GDP will fall. Instead, it is 
impossible to form either a consensus or a coherent, unitary economic plan under democracy. This fact 
is fatal to democratic socialism and possibly to deliberative democracy as well, because both seek to 
transform of society from a “civic association” or “spontaneous order” of shared means into an 
“enterprise association” or “organization” of shared ends.. Democratic political institutions and 
socialist economics are fundamentally incompatible, and neither does democracy promote consensus 
and agreement. Democracy does not enable the creation of a single shared order of values to which all 
can agree. Instead, Hayek argued that government should be limited to enabling individuals to pursue 
their own individual values and purposes.
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1 Boettke (1995) discerns these other Public Choice-style contributions in The Road to Serfdom as 
well: the logic of collective action which enables special interests to obtain privileges (cf. rent-
seeking), that political behavior is conditioned by the institutional constraints and incentives of the 
office (“why the worst get on top”), and the impossibility of maintaining political freedom without 
economic freedom (cf. Lawson and Clark 2010). 
2 When Mises said socialist calculation is “impossible,” he did not mean that one could not establish a 
persistently ongoing socialist political system. Rather, what he meant was that such a political 
system could never successfully accomplish the economic goals of its advocates (Hayek 1948: 146, 
Lavoie 1985b: 152f., Steele 1992: 109).
3 This essay is an exercise in political theory, exploring the political-institutional reasons why 
democratic socialism or economic democracy must necessarily fail to accomplish the aims and 
intentions of its advocates. It is not an application of economic price theory, and it does not attempt 
to show whether socialism must fail for purely economic, non-political reasons. That argument has 
been made elsewhere, in the Austrian literature on the impossibility of economic calculation under 
socialism (Hayek 1935; Hayek 1948: 77-91, 119-208; Brutzkus 1935; Mises 1981 [1922]: 95-194; 
Hoff 1981 [1938]; Leoni 2009 [1965]; Lavoie 1985a; Lavoie 1985b; Steele 1992; de Soto 2010; 
Boettke 1998; Boettke 2012: 76-96, 226-240). For the sake of argument, this essay assumes that 
there is no problem of rational economic calculation under socialism. As far as is this essay is 
concerned, the Lange (1938)-Lerner-Taylor solution of market socialism might as well have 
successfully refuted Mises's, Hayek's, and Rothbard's claim that rational economic calculation is 
impossible under socialism. This essay takes no stand against Shleifer and Vishny's (1994: 166) 
claim that Lange (1938) did refute Hayek and Mises. What this essay will argue is that democratic 
socialism must fail, not necessarily because it is socialist, but because it is democratic. Even if 
socialism were economically feasible, it cannot be successfully institutionalized by democratic 
means and still accomplish its goals.
4 Cf. Lavoie's (1985a: 131) statement that while advocates of democratic socialism are right to 
criticize rent-seeking, their solution to this problem – viz. expanding the government's power over 
the economy – would make the problem worse. A better solution, Lavoie says, is to limit 
government's ability to bestow privilege on anybody and to reduce the number of benefits it has to 
offer anyone. Cf. Boettke (1995: 10), who finds a similar argument in Hayek.
5 For an interesting fictional illustration of how political incentives undermine market socialism, see 
Spufford (2010: 283-299, esp. 292). For a review of Spufford's novel, showing how much historical 
detail it reliably embodies despite its fictional nature, see Henderson (2012-2013).
6 That Austrian market process theory is compatible with Public Choice political process theory, see 
Boettke and López (2002) and Ikeda (2003).
7 Ludwig von Mises (1981 [1922]: 203f.) also noticed the connection between socialism's attack on 
competition and its unintentional rehabilitation of interest group politics: “In exposing the effects of 
protection, Liberalism broke the aggressive power of particular interests. . . . In order to rehabilitate 
protection, it was necessary to destroy Liberalism. . . . Once Liberalism has been completely 
vanquished, however, and no longer menaces the protective system, there remains nothing to oppose 
the extension of particular privileges.”
8 Indeed, according to John Jewkes, the economic plans of Britain's Labour and Conservative parties 
were all mutually-contradictory (Jewkes 1968 [1948]: 80-96, 1978: 61-76). Everyone agreed they 
wanted planning but nobody agreed what the plan should be. Because no consensus could be 
reached, democratic socialism devolved into interest-group-lobbying, where every faction strove to 
funnel pork to its own constituents. As Jewkes noted, the minister of a regime of central economic 
planning “will be subject to powerful pressure groups” which will “inevitably make him the 
guardian of some vested interest” (Jewkes 1968 [1948]: 130). No coherent central plan can arise 
from this, according to Jewkes (1968 [1948]: 133; cf. ibid. 218):
an integrated scheme must inevitably be examined by those whose interests and 
knowledge are essentially local and piecemeal. The plan will be subjected to 
distortion through the activities of pressure groups.
In the foreword to the 1956 edition of The Road to Serfdom, Hayek (2007 [1944]: 51) cites an early 
(1948) edition of Jewkes's The New Ordeal by Planning (1968 [1948]), saying “[i]t is the best 
discussion known to me of a concrete instance of the phenomenon discussed in general terms in this 
book.”. Meanwhile, Jewkes described Hayek's Road to Serfdom (2007 [1944]) as “masterly” 
(Jewkes 1968 [1948]: xiii) for its “analysis which has never been confuted” (Jewkes 1968 [1948]: 
182 footnote). 
9 The context of “Thresher” 174 is unrelated to our topic, but the quote seemed apt.
10 This may buttress Buchanan's and Tullock's argument for qualified majority voting in Calculus of 
Consent (1962). If Hayek is right that government ought to act only where there is agreement, this 
might imply that all legislation should command the support of a super-majority. For reviews of 
Buchanan's and Tullock's argument, cf. Butler (2012: 95-100), Stevens (1993: 134-139), and Hinich 
and Munger (1997: 100-103).
11 According to Boettke, Hayek's form of the Arrow theorem underlies Hayek's criticism elsewhere of 
the political provision of public goods: what are the demand-revealing processes when goods are 
politically provided? (Boettke 1995: 20). Hayek did not ideologically assume market failures away, 
but he recognized that like the market process, the political process is imperfect as well – except that 
the political process does not engender the same incentives nor information as markets do to 
promote error detection and correction (Boettke 1995: 20).
12 Cf. Hayek (1967b: 100): “An assembly with unlimited powers is in a position to use that power to 
favour particular groups or individuals and it is an inevitable consequence that it will come to be 
constituted of coalitions of particular interests offering particular benefits to their supporters.” 
